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ABSTRACT
In the Bitcoin system, participants are rewarded for solving cryp-
tographic puzzles. In order to receive more consistent rewards
over time, some participants organize mining pools and split the
rewards from the pool in proportion to each participant’s contribu-
tion. However, several aacks threaten the ability to participate in
pools. e block withholding (BWH) aack makes the pool reward
system unfair by leing malicious participants receive unearned
wages while only pretending to contribute work. When two pools
launch BWH aacks against each other, they encounter the miner’s
dilemma: in a Nash equilibrium, the revenue of both pools is di-
minished. In another aack called selsh mining, an aacker can
unfairly earn extra rewards by deliberately generating forks.
In this paper, we propose a novel aack called a fork aer with-
holding (FAW) aack. FAW is not just another aack. e reward
for an FAW aacker is always equal to or greater than that for a BWH
aacker, and it is usable up to four times more oen per pool than
in BWH aack. When considering multiple pools — the current
state of the Bitcoin network – the extra reward for an FAW aack
is about 56% more than that for a BWH aack. Furthermore, when
two pools execute FAW aacks on each other, the miner’s dilemma
may not hold: under certain circumstances, the larger pool can
consistently win. More importantly, an FAW aack, while using
intentional forks, does not suer from practicality issues, unlike
selsh mining. We also discuss partial countermeasures against
the FAW aack, but nding a cheap and ecient countermeasure
remains an open problem. As a result, we expect to see FAW aacks
among mining pools.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is the rst fully decentralized cryptocurrency [29]. Its value
has increased signicantly as has its rate of adoption since its
deployment in 2009 [7]. e security properties of Bitcoin rely
on blockchain technology [32], which is an open ledger containing
all current and historical transactions in the system. To prevent
alterations of previous transactions andmaintain the integrity of the
ledger, the system requires participants to use their computational
power to generate proofs of work (PoWs) by solving cryptographic
puzzles. A PoW is required to generate a block and add transactions
to the blockchain. Aer someone generates a block by solving the
puzzle, and this solution is propagated to the Bitcoin network, a
new round starts and all nodes begin solving a new cryptographic
puzzle. e process of block generation is called mining, and those
carrying out this activity are called miners.
As of May 2017, a miner who solves a puzzle is rewarded with
12.5 bitcoins (BTC). e average time for each round (time to solve
the puzzle) is intended to be constant (10 minutes), so mining
diculty is adjusted automatically about every two weeks. As
mining diculty increases, solo miners may have to wait for a
long time, on average, to receive any reward. To prevent this
reward “starvation,” some miners have organized mining pools that
engage in prot sharing. Most pools consist of a pool manager and
worker miners. e manager runs the Bitcoin protocol, acting as
a single node, but miners join a pool by connecting to the pool’s
protocol [37] instead of directly joining Bitcoin. A pool manager
forwards unsolved work units to miners, who then generate partial
proofs of work (PPoWs) and full proofs of work (FPoWs), and submit
them to the manager as shares. If a miner generates an FPoW and
submits it to themanager, themanager broadcasts a block generated
from the FPoW to the Bitcoin system, receives the reward, and
distributes the reward to participating miners. Each miner is paid
based on the fraction of shares contributed relative to the other
miners in the pool. us, participants are rewarded based on PPoWs,
which have absolutely no value in the Bitcoin system. e Bitcoin
network currently consists of solo miners, open pools that allow
any miner to join, and closed (private) pools that require a private
relationship to join.
ere are several aacks on Bitcoin [18, 20, 34]; our work focuses
on two well-known mining aacks: selsh mining and block with-
holding. Selsh mining abuses Bitcoin’s forks mechanism to derive
an unfair reward. A fork can occur when at least two cryptographic
solutions (blocks) are propagated in a round. is may occur when
solutions are discovered almost simultaneously, and take time to
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propagate through the Bitcoin network. Only one branch of a fork
can be valid (only one solution will be accepted); others are even-
tually invalidated. In selsh mining, proposed by Eyal et al. in
2014 [18], an aacker does not propagate a block immediately, but
generates forks intentionally by propagating a block selectively
only when another honest miner generates a block. e aacker
can earn a greater reward by invalidating honest miners’ blocks if
she has enough computational power.
In a Block Withholding (BWH) aack, a miner in a pool sub-
mits only PPoWs, but not FPoWs. When an aacker launches a
BWH aack against a single pool and conducts honest mining with
the rest of her computational power, she earns an extra reward,
while the target pool takes a loss. All pools are still vulnerable to
this aack because no ecient and cheap defense has emerged,
despite ongoing research. In 2015, Eyal [15] rst modeled a game
between two BWH aacking pools, and discovered the miner’s
dilemma: when two pools aack each other, both will take a loss in
equilibrium. is is analogous to the classic “prisoners’ dilemma”.
Currently, pools implicitly agree not to launch BWH aacks against
each other because it would harm everyone. In other words, while
BWH aack is always protable, the BWH aack game is not. We
describe these two aacks in more detail in Section 2.
In this paper, we describe a new aack called a fork aer withhold-
ing (FAW) aack, which combines a BWH aack with intentional
forks. Like the BWH aack, the FAW aack is always protable
regardless of an aacker’s computational power or network connec-
tion state. e FAW aack also provides superior rewards compared
to the BWH aack – in fact, the BWH aacker’s reward is the lower
bound of the FAW aacker’s. We analyze both the single- and multi-
pool FAW aack variants in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. en,
in Section 7, we model the FAW aack game between two FAW
aacking pools and discover that the aack becomes a size game
between the two pools, breaking the miner’s dilemma stalemate.
Single-pool FAWattack. Like the BWH aacker, an FAW aacker
joins the target pool and executes an FAW aack against it. e
node submits FPoWs to the pool manager only when another miner,
neither the aacker nor a miner in the target pool, generates a block.
If the pool manager accepts the submied FPoW, he propagates it,
and a fork will be generated. en, all Bitcoin network participants
must select one branch. If the aacker’s block is selected, the target
pool receives the reward, and she is also rewarded from the pool.
When aacking a single pool, an FAW aacker can earn extra
rewards in any case. e lower bound of the extra reward is that
for a BWH aacker. In Section 5, we show quantitatively that the
FAW aacker can earn extra rewards one to four times more than
that for the BWH aacker in a large pool (representing 20% of the
computational power of the entire Bitcoin network).
Multi-pool FAW attack. To increase her reward, she can simulta-
neously aack multiple pools, so we expand our aack to consider
the FAW aack against n pools. As in the single pool case, our
analysis shows that the FAW aack is always protable, and that
the FAW aacker earns a greater reward than the BWH aacker.
If an aacker executes the FAW aack against four pools that are
currently popular [4], her extra reward will be about 56% greater
than that for the BWH aacker. Note that the extra reward for
aacking multiple pools is more than that for a single pool aack.
Details of the multi-pool aack analysis are presented in Section 6.
FAW attack game. Section 7 considers a scenario in which two
pools execute FAW aacks against each other. ere is a Nash equi-
librium in the game; however, unlike in the BWH aack game [15],
there exists a condition in which the larger pool always earns the
extra reward. at is, the miner’s dilemma may not hold. erefore,
the equilibrium for the FAW aack game in which two pools decide
whether to aack may be a Pareto optimal.
FAW attack vs. selshmining. We also compare the FAW aack
to selsh mining [18] in Section 8. Selsh mining is not always
protable, and the aacker is easily detectable. Moreover, selsh
mining is known to be impractical [8, 10, 19]. Indeed, previous
aacks on mining that generate intentional forks share these prop-
erties, making them impractical. However, unlike selsh mining,
the FAW aack is always protable, and detecting FAW aackers
is harder than detecting selsh mining aackers even though the
FAW aack does utilize intentional forks.
In Section 9, we discuss various parameters used throughout
the study, some of which can be computed in advance, making
FAW aacks feasible. One specic parameter is hard to compute
in advance, but we show that the FAW aack is still protable
even without knowing it. Moreover, it is possible to identify Sybil
nodes, but not the aacker. oughwe also propose several possible
countermeasures, including a method for detecting FAW aacks in
Section 10, we nd no practical defense for FAW aacks.
Contributions. is paper makes the following contributions:
(1) We propose the FAW aack, which is always protable
(unlike selsh mining) regardless of the aacker’s compu-
tational power and network capability. e extra reward
for an FAW aack is always at least as high as that for a
BWH aack.
(2) We analyze the FAW aack when the aack target is one
pool and generalize to an aack against n pools. Moreover,
we consider an FAW aack pool game, in which two pools
execute FAW aacks against each other. We prove that
it can give rise to a pool size game, deviating from the
miner’s dilemma that exists in the BWH aack.
(3) We discuss and propose partial countermeasures for pre-
venting an FAW aack. However, these defenses are nei-
ther perfect nor practical, leaving an open problem.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Although built with security inmind, Bitcoin is vulnerable to several
aacks that allow an aacker to unfairly earn additional prots
at others’ expense. In this section, we describe Bitcoin and the
existing aacks against it that are related to our aack.
2.1 Bitcoin Basics
Mining Process: e header of each block in a blockchain con-
tains a Merkle root [26] of the latest transactions, the hash value of
the previous block header, and a nonce. In the Bitcoin system, “min-
ing” is the process of generating nonces, which are PoWs derived
from solving cryptographic puzzles. is work is performed by
peers, known as “miners”. In short, a miner must nd a valid nonce
as a PoW satisfying sha256(sha256(blkhdr )) < t , where blkhdr
refers to all data in a block header, and t is a 256-bit number spec-
ied by the Bitcoin protocol, so it is more dicult to nd a valid
nonce given a smaller t . e value of t is automatically adjusted by
the Bitcoin system to keep the average duration of each round 10
minutes. When a miner nds a valid nonce and generates a new
block, this block is broadcast to every node in the Bitcoin network.
When another node receives it, the node regards this block as the
new head of the blockchain. At the time of writing, a miner re-
ceives 12.5 BTC as a reward for solving the puzzle and extending
the blockchain at the expense of computational power.
Forks: If two miners independently build and broadcast two dier-
ent valid blocks, a node may consider the block rst received as the
new blockchain head. Because of dierent network latencies [13],
more than two heads can exist at the same time. is situation is
called a fork. By appending a subsequent block to only one branch
in the fork, the branch is dened as valid, while all others are inval-
idated. Moreover, forks can also be intentionally generated. When
an aacker generates a block, she can withhold it until another
miner generates and propagates another block. en, the aacker
can propagate her block right aer she listens to the block prop-
agation, intentionally causing a fork, for double-spending [31] or
selsh mining [18, 30, 35] aacks.
Mining Pools: Because successfully generating blocks requires
a non-trivial amount of luck, mining pools have been organized
to reduce variance in the miners’ rewards as mining diculty in-
creases. Most mining pools consist of a manager and multiple
miners. At the start of every round, the manager distributes work
to the miners [37], and every miner uses his computing power to
generate either partial (PPoW) or full (FPoW) PoWs. e diculty
of generating a PPoW is lower than that of an FPoW. For example,
the hash value of a block header can have a 32-bit and 72-bit zero
prex in a PPoW and in an FPoW, respectively. When a miner
generates a PPoW or an FPoW, he submits it as a share. If a miner is
lucky enough to generate an FPoW, the manager propagates it and
receives a reward, which he shares with the miners in proportion
to their submissions.
2.2 Related Work
We review two related aacks on Bitcoin mining and new Bitcoin
protocol designs in this section.
Selsh Mining: Selsh mining [3, 18] generates forks intention-
ally. If an aacker generates an FPoW, she does not propagate it
immediately. As soon as another miner propagates a block, the at-
tacker selectively propagates her withheld blocks according to their
number to generate a fork. is fork may invalidate honest miners’
blocks, and the aacker can improperly earn an extra reward. How-
ever, because the aacker can also lose her block if her branch is not
chosen, she must have greater computational power to make selsh
mining protable, especially if her network connection capability
is low [18]. Many researchers have investigated selsh mining.
Sapirshtein et al. [35] and Nayak et al. [30] showed that the original
selsh mining scheme is not optimal and provided a new algorithm
to optimize the selsh mining. e former study [35] modeled
an optimal selsh mining strategy using the delay parameter of
the Bitcoin network rather than the aacker’s network capability.
It also stated that a protable selsh miner can execute a double
spending aack. Nayak et al. [30] extended the parameters used
for selsh mining strategy and combined selsh mining with a
network-level eclipse aack. Although powerful, selsh mining is
widely considered to be impractical [10, 30]. Carlsten et al. studied
selsh mining under a transaction fee regime (a Bitcoin reward
system for the far future) and improved the aack by considering a
variable reward for each block [11]. Selsh mining and FAW aacks
are compared in Section 8.
BWHAttack: e BWH aack was introduced by Rosenfeld [34].
An aacker joins a target pool and then submits only PPoWs, but not
FPoWs, unlike honest pool miners. Because the aacker pretends
to contribute to the target pool and gets paid, the pool suers
a loss. Courtois et al. [12] generalized the concept of the BWH
aack, considering an aacker who mines both solo and in pools.
ey showed that the aacker can unfairly earn a greater reward
through a BWH aack. is aack was carried out against the
“Eligius” mining pool in 2014, with the pool losing 300 BTC [5].
In this case, the manager found the aacker, who was using only
two Bitcoin accounts and did not submit FPoWs for an extended
period of time. If the aacker had used manymore Bitcoin accounts,
distributing computational power across them and masquerading
as many workers, each of whom would mine in the pool for only a
short time before being replaced with a new account, the manager
may not have detected her. Meanwhile, managers can always notice
whether a BWH aack has occurred by comparing the number of
submied PPoWs and FPoWs. However, managers cannot prevent
the aack. In 2015, Luu et al. [24] found the optimal BWH aack
strategy against one pool and multiple pools by dening the power
spliing game. Eyal [15] modeled the BWH aack game between
two mining pools. is study showed that such a game results in
the miner’s dilemma, which is analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma,
because it creates mutual loss in the Nash equilibrium. We propose
the FAW aack, which improves the BWH aack. e FAW aack
gives an aacker extra rewards up to four times more than those
for a BWH aacker. Moreover, we show that the miner’s dilemma
may not hold in the FAW aack game. FAW and BWH aacks
can occur against Ethereum [38], Litecoin [22], Dogecoin [14], and
Permacoin [27] as well as Bitcoin.
New Bitcoin Protocols: Many papers have proposed new proto-
cols to solve various problems with Bitcoin such as selsh mining,
double spending, and scalability [16, 21, 23, 36]. To prevent BWH
aacks, several works [17, 34] have proposed new two-phase PoW
protocols, dividing work into two smaller cryptographic puzzles.
en, a manager gives one puzzle to miners in his pool and solves
the other himself. As a result, miners cannot know whether their
solutions are FPoWs and cannot execute BWH aacks. Under these
protocols, an FAW aack also cannot happen. However, Bitcoin
participants do not want to adopt them, for reasons described in
Section 10.3. Luu et al. [25] proposed a decentralized pool protocol
called SmartPool that applies smart contracts. ey argued that at-
tacks on pools would no longer be protable if SmartPool exists as
only one mining pool in the Bitcoin system. However, SmartPool’s
full adoption is considered to be a long way o [1]. We discuss other
possible defense mechanisms against an FAW aack in Section 10.3.
3 ATTACK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we specify our aack model and the assumptions
made in the rest of the paper.
3.1 Attack Model
First, an aacker can be a solo miner, or the manager of a closed or
open mining pool. Second, the aacker can launch Sybil aacks [2],
i.e., the aacker can generate an arbitrary number of identities and
join multiple open pools with dierent IDs and Bitcoin accounts.
However, we assume that the aacker cannot join closed pools since
those require private information. ird, the computational power
of an aacker is nite, and she can distribute it into any fraction for
both innocent mining (i.e., working as an honest solo miner) and
inltration mining (i.e., joining and mining in multiple open pools
to gain extra illicit rewards). If an aacker is the manager of an open
pool, her inltration mining power (the computational power used
for inltration mining) should be loyal mining power 1 (the amount
of loyal mining power pools possess is generally a trade secret [15]).
Finally, the rushing adversary can plant many Sybil nodes in the
Bitcoin network, which can simply listen to the propagation of valid
blocks and propagate the aacker’s block preferentially when the
aacker’s block and another block are released simultaneously. By
this means, the aacker can track the propagation of other blocks
and propagate her own as fast as possible using Sybil nodes. Note
that these nodes require very lile computational power because
their role is only to listen and propagate a block; thus planting Sybil
nodes involves negligible computation cost for the aacker.
3.2 Assumptions
For the sake of simplicity, we make the following assumptions,
consistent with other aacks on Bitcoin mining [15, 18, 24]:
(1) e normalized total computational power of the Bitcoin
system is 1. erefore, any computational power is rep-
resented as a fraction of this total. Also, we assume that
the computational power of any one miner or mining pool
is less than 0.5 to prevent a “51% aack” on the Bitcoin
network [9].
(2) No managers or miners, except FAW aackers, launch
aacks. We do not consider other aacks, such as BWH
aacks or selsh mining, alongside the FAW aack.
(3) e reward for each valid block is normalized to 1 BTC
instead of the current 12.5 BTC. Moreover, we calculate
the reward as a probabilistic expectation for each round.
(4) We do not consider unintentional forks. is assumption
is reasonable because the fork rates are negligible (the re-
cent stale block rate is about 0.41% [19]). Because of this
assumption, the reward for a miner is equal to the prob-
ability of nding a block by the miner for one round. A
period of nding a block by a miner has an exponential
distribution with mean inversely proportional to his com-
putational power. erefore, the probability of nding a
1Dened by Eyal as “mining power . . . either run directly by the pool owners or sold
as a service but run on the pool owners’ hardware” [15].
block from a miner for one round is the same as his relative
computational power.
(5) When a miner in a pool generates an FPoW, the manager
propagates a block corresponding to the FPoW and earns
the reward. en, the manager distributes the reward to
each miner in his pool in proportion to the miners’ sub-
mission shares for each round.
4 ATTACK OVERVIEW
We describe a novel aack, called an FAW aack, combining selsh
mining and a BWH aack. e core idea is that an aacker can split
his computing power between innocent mining and inltrationmin-
ing, aiming at a target pool (as with a BWH aack). However, when
the aacker nds an FPoW as an inltration miner, she deviates
from the paern of a BWH aack. In a BWH aack, the aacker
drops the FPoW; in an FAW aack, she does not immediately prop-
agate it to the pool manager, waiting instead for an external honest
miner to publish theirs, at which point she propagates the FPoW to
the manager hoping to cause a fork (similar to selsh mining). We
present not only the FAW aack against one target pool but also
a generalized FAW aack against multiple pools simultaneously.
Finally, we present an FAW aack game in which two pools aack
each other via inltration. e following are detailed descriptions
of these FAW aack scenarios.
4.1 One Target Pool
Considering an aacker who targets one open pool, the FAW aack
proceeds as follows. First, an aacker conducts both innocent
and inltration mining by distributing her computational power
to join the target pool. If the aacker nds an FPoW through
innocent mining, she propagates it and earns a legitimate prot.
However, if the aacker nds an FPoW in the target pool, she
does not submit it immediately. Aer this, there are three possible
paths the aacker can take. 1) When she notices that other miners,
not participating in the target pool, propagate a valid block, she
immediately submits her FPoW to the manager of the target pool,
who propagates her FPoW to other Bitcoin nodes, generating a fork
in the Bitcoin network. 2) When an honest miner in the target pool
nds an FPoW, the aacker discards her FPoW. 3) When she nds
another FPoW through innocent mining, she discards the FPoW
generated by inltration mining. In summary, the FAW aack
generates intentional forks propagated by the target pool, while the
BWH aack never does so. is detailed algorithm is Algorithm 1
in Appendix A.
Based on this simple description, it is easy to see that the FAW
aack is at least as protable as the BWH aack. Note that the
prot from the FAW aack is equal to that for the BWH aack
in cases 2) and 3). In other words, additional prot comes from
case 1). Suppose the aacker submits multiple FPoWs in case 1)
over multiple rounds. If none of the FPoWs are chosen as the main
chain, the prot from the FAW aack is equal to that from the BWH
aack. If any of the aacker’s FPoWs are chosen, the target pool
receives a reward, which is distributed among miners including the
inltration miner. is gives additional prot to the aacker.
Moreover, a manager’s behavior can vary. If a manager notices
a valid block from outside the pool before the inltration miner
submits her FPoW, an honest manager would discard the FPoW
generated by the inltration miner. However, if accepting the
inltration miner’s FPoW is more protable (or would cause a
smaller loss for the manager), a rational manager may discard the
FPoW from the outside instead. Otherwise, if an aacker propagates
the withheld FPoW to the manager before the manager notices
an external block propagation, the manager always selects the
FPoW from the aacker regardless of his rational consideration.
We discuss this rational behavior in more detail in Section 10.
4.2 Multiple Target Pools
An aacker can target multiple pools to generate a higher reward.
For simplicity, we rst consider an FAW aack executed against two
pools (Pool1 and Pool2). Aer the aacker joins the two target pools,
she distributes her computational power for innocent mining and
inltration mining between these pools. As in the single-pool case,
when the aacker nds an FPoW in Pool1 or Pool2, she withholds it
to generate a fork. However, in this case, she may nd two dierent
FPoWs, one for each pool, within a single round and withhold both.
If another honest miner propagates an FPoW, the aacker submits
both FPoWs to both managers simultaneously. is behavior raises
the winning probability of the inltration miners’ blocks in the fork
by reducing propagation delay. erefore, the aacker can make a
fork that has two branches generated by herself and another found
by an external honest miner, by leing two target pools release
two dierent valid blocks to the Bitcoin network at the same time.
When the aacker targets n pools, she can execute the FAW aack
as above to generate a fork with n + 1 branches. e detailed
algorithm is Algorithm 2 in Appendix A.
4.3 Pool vs Pool
e activities of mining pools can be interpreted as a game in the
Bitcoin system, with each pool choosing its strategy. We consider
the FAW aack as a strategy that pools can choose to earn higher
rewards, meaning that an FAW aack game can occur similarly to
a BWH aack case [15]. For simplicity, we assume that two pools,
Pool1 and Pool2, play the game and all other miners are solo miners.
Pool1 and Pool2 rst divide their own computational power into
two parts for innocent and inltration mining, and each pool in-
ltrates the other using its inltration mining power. While both
conduct innocent and inltration mining, if Pool1 nds an FPoW
in Pool2 by inltration mining, it withholds it. Aer that, if Pool1
generates an FPoW using innocent mining, it throws away its with-
held FPoW generated by inltration mining, and the Pool1 manager
propagates the FPoW from its innocent mining. e same action can
be expected from Pool2 with regard to Pool1. Otherwise, if someone
from outside both pools broadcasts a valid block, the pools generate
a fork using their withheld FPoWs. erefore, a fork created under
these conditions can include two or three branches (three branches
might occur if both Pool1 and Pool2 have withheld FPoWs obtained
from inltration mining). If both competing pools generate FPoWs
through inltration mining, they select the FPoW generated from
the opponent’s inltration mining for the main chain. For example,
the manager of Pool1 selects the FPoW generated by inltration
mining of Pool2 in Pool1.
5 FAW ATTACKS AGAINST ONE POOL
In this section, we analyze the optimal behavior and maximum
reward for an aacker theoretically and quantitatively when she
targets one pool. Our results show that the extra reward for an FAW
aack is always equal to or greater than that for a BWH aack.
5.1 eoretical Analysis
We mathematically analyze our aack against one pool and derive
the optimal behavior of an aacker. e relevant parameters are as
follows:
α : Computational power of the aacker
β : Computational power of the victim pool
τ : Aacker’s Inltration mining power as a proportion of α
c: Probability that an aacker’s FPoW through inltration
mining will be selected as the main chain
e aacker uses computational power (1 − τ )α for innocent min-
ing and τα for inltration mining. Note that β does not include
the aacker’s inltration mining power in the victim pool. e
parameter c is a coecient closely related to the topology of the
Bitcoin network [28] and the aacker’s network capability. 2 We
describe the parameter c in detail in Section 9.
We can divide the aack results in each round into four cases
as shown in Fig. 1. In the rst case, the aacker earns a reward
through innocent mining. Because she as an innocent miner should
compete with others who have total computational power 1 − τα ,
the probability of the rst case is (1−τ )α1−τ α . In the second case, the
pool propagates an FPoW found by an honest miner in the pool,
with a probability of β1−τ α . In the third case, when a valid block
is found by an external honest miner (neither the aacker nor
someone within the target pool), the aacker can generate a fork
through the pool if she found and withheld an FPoW in advance.
e probability is τα · 1−α−β1−τ α . e nal case occurs when a valid
block is found by an external honest miner, but the aacker has
not found and withheld an FPoW. e probability of this case is
1−α −β . As expected, the total probability of these four cases sums
to 1. en, we can derive the FAW aacker’s reward as follows.
Theorem 5.1. An FAW aacker can earn
Ra (τ ) = (1 − τ )α1 − τα +
(
β
1 − τα + cτα ·
1 − α − β
1 − τα
)
· τα
β + τα
. (1)
e reward is maximized when the optimal τ value, τ , is
(1−α )(1−c)β+β 2c−β√(1−α−β )2c2+((1−α−β )(α β+α−2))c−α (1+β )+1
α (1−α−β )(c(1−β )−1)
(2)
Proof Sketch. Because an aacker works as both an innocent
and inltration miner, she is rewarded in both roles. Her reward
from innocent mining is
(1 − τ )α
1 − τα
(case A in Fig. 1). To derive her reward from inltration mining,
we rst describe the reward for the pool to which the inltration
2Network capability has been used in previous work [18, 19], but γ in those works is
slightly dierent from c .
∂Ra
∂γ
=
α 2β 2 + (((2α 2 − 2α 3)β − 2α 2β 2)c + (2α 3 − 2α 2)β )γ + ((α 3 − α 4 + (α 4 − 2α 3)β + α 3β 2)c + α 3β + α 4 − α 3)γ 2
α 4γ 4 + (2α 4β − 2α 3)γ 3 + (α 2 − 4α 2β + α 2β 2)γ 2 + (2α β − 2α β 2)γ + β 2 = 0
(3)
Figure 1: Four cases of FAW attack results against one pool.
A e attacker nds an FPoW through innocent mining, B
a miner other than the attacker in the target pool nds an
FPoW, C the attacker nds an FPoW in the target pool and
generates a fork, and D someone else nds an FPoW, but she
does not. Blocks found by an attacker are displayed in dark
gray. e attacker can earn rewards in cases A , B , and C .
miner belongs. e pool can earn a prot in two cases: when an
honest miner in the pool generates an FPoW (case B ), and when
the aacker successfully generates a fork and her FPoW is selected
as the main chain (case C ). In case B , the pool earns the reward
β
1−τ α . In case C , the reward for the pool is cτα · 1−α−β1−τ α through
the fork generated by the aacker. erefore, the pool can earn the
reward
β
1 − τα + cτα ·
1 − α − β
1 − τα .
en the pool manager pays a reward proportional to the at-
tacker’s submied (both full and partial) PoWs, and the aacker’s
estimated contribution from the pool manager is τ αβ+τ α . As a re-
sult, the aacker’s reward Ra can be expressed with Eq. (1). e
aacker’s reward Ra is a function of τ , and we can nd the value
of τ that maximizes Ra by solving Eq. (3). We call this value of τ as
τ . Finally, τ is expressed in Eq. (2). 
According to the theorem above, an aacker should distribute
her inltration mining power as an optimal portion τ of her total
power to earn the maximum reward. Additionally, an FAW aack
with optimal τ satises the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2. An FAW aack is always more protable than hon-
est mining, and the reward from an FAW aack has a lower bound
dened by the reward from a BWH aack.
Proof Sketch. We show that the aacker’s reward, Ra (τ ), is
always greater than the honest miner’s reward α . First, the reward
Ra when c = 0 is equal to the reward from the BWH aack since a
case where the FAW aacker receives zero reward due to a fork is
equivalent to the BWH aack. Luu et al. [24] proved that the BWH
aacker’s reward can always be larger than α when a proper value
of τ is chosen. Furthermore, Ra is an increasing function of c . As a
result, an FAW aack produces an extra reward regardless of the
aacker’s computational power, as in the BWH aack. 
eorem 5.2 states as mentioned intuitively in Section 4.1 that
the FAW aack is at least as protable as the BWH aack. Note that
τ depends on a constant c , related to network topology [6, 28]. To
maximize reward, an aacker must know the value of c . For now,
we assume that c is given to the aacker, but learning c is not easy
in practice. Nevertheless, we show in Section 9 that the FAW aack
still improves upon the BWH aack even when c is unknown.
Next, our focus moves to the target pool’s loss. rough the
following theorem, it is shown that the target pool’s reward aer
the FAW aack is always smaller than that it would be without,
though incentives do exist for the target pool manager to propagate
the FPoW found by the aacker’s inltration mining even if he
notices the FPoW is stale.
Theorem 5.3. e reward for the target pool is Rp = β1−τ α +
cτα
1−α−β
1−τ α , and this is always less than β + τα , which is the target
pool’s reward without the FAW aack. Additionally, reward Rp is an
increasing function of c .
Proof Sketch. e target pool earns the reward β1−τ α in case B
and cτα 1−α−β1−τ α in case C . erefore, Rp can be expressed as
β
1 − τα + cτα
1 − α − β
1 − τα ,
and Rp is a linear function of c with positive coecient. is means
that Rp is an increasing function of c . Finally, we show that Rp is
always less than β + τα .
Rp =
β
1 − τα + cτα
1 − α − β
1 − τα
≤ β1 − τα + τα
1 − α − β
1 − τα when c = 1
< β + τα when 0 ≤ τ < 1
⇐⇒ β + τα(1 − α − β) < (β + τα)(1 − τα)
⇐⇒ β + τα − τα2 − ταβ < β − βτα + τα − τ 2α2
⇐⇒ τ 2α2 < τα2
⇐⇒ τ < 1
Because τ is less than 1, Rp is always less than β + τα . 
Note that the target pool’s loss decreases as c increases. ere-
fore, the pool manager should try to increase c to reduce loss. us,
he should propagate his FPoWs as fast as he can, which incidentally
also increases the aacker’s extra reward (Ra in Eq. (1)).
5.2 antitative Analysis
In this section we consider a specic case: an aacker with com-
putational power 0.2, who executes an FAW aack against one
pool. We dene the relative extra reward (RER) gained with respect
to the reward Rh of an honest miner, which is equivalent to his
computational power. e RER R′a of an aacker can be expressed
as
R
′
a =
Ra − Rh
Rh
.
In the same manner, the RER of the target pool is
R
′
p =
Rp − Rh
Rh
.
(A negative value indicates a loss.) Figs. 2a and 2b show the RER
of the aacker and a victim pool, respectively, given terms c and β
when the aacker’s computational power α is 0.2.
(a) e RER (%) of an attacker, R′a , ac-
cording to target pool size β and net-
work capability c when the attacker’s
computational power α is 0.2.
(b) e RER (%) of a target pool, R′p ,
according to β and c when the at-
tacker’s computational power α is 0.2.
Negative RER means loss.
Figure 2: antitative analysis results for the FAW attack
against one pool. When c increases, attacker’s reward in-
creases and the target pool’s loss decreases.
Fig. 2a demonstrates that an aacker can earn an extra reward
regardless of c or the target pool size β . erefore, an aacker
should always run the FAW aack to increase her own reward.
Moreover, increasing c provides an even greater extra reward. As
noted previously, when c is zero, the RERs for BWH and FAW
aacks are the same. erefore, the extra reward for the FAW
aacker is always lower bounded by that for the BWH aacker.
us, the FAW aack improves on the BWH aack in all cases.
Conversely, Fig. 2b conrms that a target pool always suers
a loss in the presence of an aacker. (A negative extra reward
indicates a loss.) However, the loss of the target pool decreases as
the value of c increases because when the FPoW generated by an
aacker in the target pool is selected as the main chain, the target
pool also earns a reward for the block.
5.3 Simulation Results
To verify the theoretical analysis developed, we simulated an FAW
aack against one pool with a computational power of 0.2, using
a Monte Carlo method over 109 rounds, with an upper bound of
10−4 for error. Table 1 shows the aacker’s RER (%) according to
her computational power α and c when β is 0.2. She can always
earn the extra reward by executing the FAW aack, and her extra
reward is equal to or greater than that for the BWH aacker.
6 FAW ATTACK AGAINST MULTIPLE POOLS
An aacker should maximize her reward by targeting n pools simul-
taneously. She distributes her inltration power among n pools and
can nd at most n FPoWs, one for each of n dierent pools within a
Table 1: e RER (%) of an attacker when target pool size β is
0.2. e value a (b) gives RERs based on theoretical analysis
and simulation, respectively.
c
α 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 0.53 (0.53) 1.14 (1.14) 1.85 (1.85) 2.70 (2.70)
0.25 0.65 (0.67) 1.38 (1.38) 2.20 (2.20) 3.1 (3.13)
0.5 0.85 (0.85) 1.74 (1.74) 2.70 (2.70) 3.75 (3.75)
0.75 1.21 (1.22) 2.37 (2.37) 3.52 (3.52) 4.69 (4.70)
1 2.12 (2.12) 3.75 (3.75) 5.13 (5.13) 6.37 (6.36)
Figure 3: Five cases of FAW attack results against multiple
pools. A An attacker nds an FPoW through innocent min-
ing, B anotherminer in the target pool nds an FPoW, C the
attacker nds an FPoW in one target pool and generates a
fork, D the attacker nds an FPoW in multiple target pools
and generates a fork, and E someone else nds an FPoW.
e attacker can earn rewards in cases A , B , C , and D .
given round, so she can generate a fork that has a maximum of n+1
branches. In this section, we analyze this scenario theoretically
and quantitatively. Unless otherwise stated, we describe the n-pool
aack using an example where n = 2 for ease of exposition.
6.1 eoretical Analysis
Let the computational power of an aacker be α and the power of
Pool1 and Pool2 be β1 and β2, respectively. e aacker distributes
her computational power into τ1 and τ2 fractions for inltration
mining in Pool1 and Pool2, respectively. When an aacker with-
holds an FPoW in Pooli only, and an external honest miner releases
a valid block (Case C in Fig. 3), the variable c(1)i represents the
probability that the FPoW of the inltration miner in Pooli will be
selected as the main chain. Variable c(2)i is the probability that the
FPoW found by her inltration mining in Pooli will be selected as
the main chain among three branches if she withholds FPoWs from
both pools when an external honest miner propagates a valid block
(Case D in Fig. 3). erefore, the sum of c(2)1 and c
(2)
2 must be less
than or equal to 1. en we can derive her reward Ra as follows.
Theorem 6.1. When the FAW aacker executes the FAW aack
against Pool1 and Pool2, she can earn reward Ra as
(1 − τ1 − τ2)α
1 − (τ1 + τ2)α +
∑
i=1,2
{
τiα
βi + τiα
(
βi
1 − (τ1 + τ2)α
+ c (1)i τiα
1 − α − β1 − β2
1 − τiα + c
(2)
i
∑
j
{τjα
τ¬jα
1 − τiα }
1 − α − β1 − β2
1 − (τ1 + τ2)α
)} (4)
Proof Sketch. e total reward for the aacker is composed
of rewards from innocent mining and inltration mining in Pool1
and Pool2. e reward from innocent mining (case A in Fig. 3) is
(1 − τ1 − τ2)α
1 − (τ1 + τ2)α .
Prior to deriving the inltrationmining part of the aacker’s reward
from Pool1 and Pool2, we derive the total reward for each target
pool. When an FPoW is found by an honest miner in the target
pools, (case B in Fig. 3), target Pooli can earn
βi
1 − (τ1 + τ2)α .
Next, if the aacker generates an intentional fork with two branches
(case C in Fig. 3), and the aacker’s FPoW is selected as the main
chain, Pooli can earn
c
(1)
i τiα
1 − α − β1 − β2
1 − τiα .
Finally, we consider case D when the aacker generates an inten-
tional fork with three branches and the aacker’s FPoW is selected
as the main chain. is case means that she nds two FPoWs in
both Pool1 and Pool2 within one round, respectively. If the aacker
rst nds an FPoW in Pool1 and the FPoW is selected as the main
chain, Pool1 can earn the reward
c
(2)
1 τ1α
τ2α
1 − τ1α
1 − α − β1 − β2
1 − (τ1 + τ2)α .
Otherwise if the aacker nds another FPoW in Pool1 aer she
nds an FPoW in Pool2 and the aacker’s FPoW in Pool1 is selected
as the main chain, then Pool1 can earn the reward
c
(2)
1 τ2α
τ1α
1 − τ2α
1 − α − β1 − β2
1 − (τ1 + τ2)α
As a result, Pooli can earn
c
(2)
i
∑
j=1,2
τjα
τ¬jα
1 − τjα
1 − α − β1 − β2
1 − (τ1 + τ2)α
through case D , and the total reward of Pooli is
βi
1−(τ1+τ2)α + c
(1)
i τiα
1−α−β1−β2
1−τiα + c
(2)
i
∑
j {τjα τ¬jα1−τiα }
1−α−β1−β2
1−(τ1+τ2)α .
en the reward for the aacker from Pooli is a fraction τiαβi+τiα
of the total reward for Pooli . erefore, considering all cases, the
total reward for the aacker, Ra , can be derived by Eq. (4). 
Below, we expand to the FAWaack targetingn pools, computing
the aacker’s reward Ra . e theorem can be proven in a similar
way as eorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.2. Generalization for n pools, where the computational
power of target Pooli is βi and the fraction of the aacker’s power
devoted to the pool is τi . e total reward for the aacker, Ra , is
Ra =
(1 − τ )α
1 − τ α +
n∑
i=1
[
τiα
βi + τiα
(
βi
1 − τ α
+
n∑
k=1
{
(1 − α − β )
∑
Pk,i ∈P
cIm(Pk,i )(i)
k∏
t=1
τPk,i (t )α
1 −∑td=1 τPk,i (d )α
})]
,
(5)
when aacking n pools with the following conditions hold: τ =∑n
i=1 τi , β =
∑n
i=1 βi , Pk,i is a one-to-one function from {1, 2, ...,k}
to {1, 2, ...,n}, where an image of Pk,i (i.e., Im(Pk,i )) must include
i , and cIm(Pk,i )(i) is the probability that the aacker’s FPoW in Pooli
will be selected as the main chain when she nds one FPoW in each
of k pools.
Proof Sketch. First, the aacker can earn the reward (1−τ )α1−τ α
from innocent mining. When an honest miner in Pooli nds an
FPoW, the aacker can earn the reward
βi
1 − τα ·
τiα
βi + τiα
.
Next, we consider the casewhen she generates forkswithk branches.
If she nds and withholds an FPoW in each of k pools including
Pooli , and the FPoW from Pooli is selected as the main chain, Pooli
as well as the aacker can earn rewards. From this case, Pooli can
earn the reward
(1 − α − β )
∑
Pk,i ∈P
cIm(Pk,i )(i)
k∏
t=1
τPk,i (t )α
1 −∑td=1 τPk,i (d )α .
en the aacker earns a τiαβi+τiα portion of the above reward.
Finally, when considering all values of k and i , the total reward for
the aacker is Eq. (5). 
Eq. (5) is a function of τi (i = 1, . . . ,n); therefore, an aacker
canmaximize her RERR′a depending on the value of τi (i = 1, . . . ,n).
Moreover, the total reward for each target Pooli increases as cIm(Pk,i )(i)
increases. erefore, to reduce loss, target pool managers should
try to increase cIm(Pk,i )(i), which in turn increases the aacker’s
extra reward.
6.2 antitative Analysis
Seven parameters are used to represent a two-pool aack, which
determine the aacker’s RER: α , βi , c(j)i for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. For
simplicity, we make the following assumptions: rst, the aacker’s
computation power, α , is assumed to be 0.2. ree cases for the two
pools’ power: cases 1, 2, and 3 have (β1, β2) equal to (0.1, 0.1), (0.2,
0.1), and (0.3, 0.1), respectively. We also assume cIm(Pk,i )(i) = ck
where c ranges from 0 to 1. Fig. 4 shows the aacker’s RERs (%) for
various values of c . As expected, as c increases, RER also increases.
Furthermore, when the total computational power of the two target
pools increases, RER also increases.
As an additional case (case 4), we also analyzed the FAW at-
tacker’s RER, taking an approximate computational power distribu-
tion from the current Bitcoin network as shown in Table 2, obtained
from [4]. Assume that F2Pool executes the FAW aack against four
other open pools. In this case, AntPool, BTCC Pool, BW.com, and
BitFury correspond to Pool1, Pool2, Pool3, and Pool4, respectively.
Figure 4: Rewards for an FAW attacker against two pools
when her computational power is α = 0.2. Cases 1, 2, and 3
represent two target poolswith computational power (β1, β2)
equal to (0.1, 0.1), (0.2, 0.1), and (0.3, 0.1), respectively. Case 4
represents when F2Pool executes the FAW attack against all
open pools in Table 2. eoretical analysis result matches
with simulation results approximately.
Because of the symmetry between three pools, optimal values for in-
ltration mining power as a portion of the aacker’s computational
power for each target pool (i.e., τ2, τ3, and τ4) are the same.
e RER for an aacker in case 4 is also shown in Fig. 4. Con-
sidering the current pool distribution shown in Table 2, the BWH
aack gives the aacker an RER of 2.96%, but she can earn a maxi-
mum RER of 4.63% with the FAW aack. erefore, the FAW aack
gives her an extra reward of 56.24% more than that the BWH aack.
Table 2: Approximate Bitcoin power distribution [4], includ-
ing closed pools and solo miners marked as Unknown.
Owner Computational Power Owner Computational Power
Unknown 30% BTCC Pool 10%
F2Pool 20% BW.com 10%
AntPool 20% BitFury 10%
6.3 Simulation Results
To verify the accuracy of this analysis, we implemented a Monte
Carlo simulator in Python to simulate an FAW aack against the
two pools in cases 1, 2, and 3 in Fig. 4. e ×-marks show simulation
results for 108 rounds, conrming the calculations.
7 TWO-POOL FAW ATTACK GAME
As described in Section 4, pools can execute FAW aacks against
each other as well. We model a simultaneous game between two
players, Pool1 and Pool2. We know that compliance with Bitcoin
protocol by both players is not a Nash equilibrium, because the
FAW aacker can earn extra rewards as discussed in Sections 5
and 6. In this section, we prove and derive the following result in
the Nash equilibrium. In the case of an FAW aack, 1) the miner’s
dilemma no longer applies, and 2) the game outcome is based on
pool size, where the larger pool wins the game. Note that while
the game is generalizable to n pools, we leave an exact analysis for
Figure 5: Four cases of the two-pool FAW attack game. A
Pool1 (or Pool2) nds an FPoW by innocent mining, B Pool1
(or Pool2) nds an FPoW using inltration mining and gen-
erates a fork, C Pool1 and Pool2 both nd an FPoW in the
opponent pool through inltration mining and generate a
fork, and D someone else nds an FPoW. Each pool can earn
a reward in cases A , B , and C .
future work. Before analyzing the two-pool FAW aack game, we
dene the winning condition as earning an extra reward. By this
denition, the game outcome indicates either a single winner, or
no winner (as in the miner’s dilemma).
7.1 eoretical Analysis of the Game
Parameters for the analysis of the FAW aack game are dened as
below for i = 1, 2.
αi : Computational power of Pooli
fi : Inltration mining power of Pooli , i.e., fi = τiαi
When both rational players choose the FAW aack as a strategy,
the players’ rewards are as follows.
Theorem 7.1. In the FAW aack game between two pools, the
rewards R1 of Pool1 and R2 of Pool2 are:
R1 =
α1−f1
1−f1−f2 + c2 f2
1−α1−α2
1−f2 + c
′
2 f1 f2( 11−f1 +
1
1−f2 )
1−α1−α2
1−f1−f2 + R2
f1
α2+f1
(6)
R2 =
α2−f2
1−f1−f2 + c1 f1
1−α1−α2
1−f1 + c
′
1 f1 f2( 11−f1 +
1
1−f2 )
1−α1−α2
1−f1−f2 + R1
f2
α1+f2
(7)
Proof Sketch. Pool1 and Pool2 can earn rewards in cases A ,
B , and C in Figure 5. Case A represents when an honest miner
in one pool nds an FPoW. According to case A , Pooli can earn
αi − fi
1 − f1 − f2 .
Case B represents when only one of the two pools nds an FPoW
in the opponent pool using inltration mining and submits it to the
opponent pool when another miner nds another valid block. If the
FPoW mined by an inltration miner of Pooli in the opponent pool
is selected as the main chain (with probability ci ), the opponent
pool can earn the reward
ci fi
1 − α1 − α2
1 − fi .
e nal case shows when inltration miners of both pools nd
FPoWs in each of the opponent pool and someone other than the
two pools nds another FPoW. We dene c′i as the probability that
the FPoW from Pooli ’s inltration mining in the opponent pool
is selected as the main chain among three branches. In case C , if
the inltration miner of Pool1 rst nds an FPoW in the opponent
(Pool2) and the FPoW is selected as the main chain, Pool2 can earn
the reward
c
′
1 f1
f2
1 − f1
1 − α1 − α2
1 − f1 − f2 .
If the inltration miner of Pool1 nds another FPoW in Pool2 aer
an inltration miner of Pool2 nds an FPoW in Pool1, Pool2 can
earn the reward
c
′
1 f2
f1
1 − f2
1 − α1 − α2
1 − f1 − f2 ,
when the FPoW found from an inltration miner of Pool1 is selected
as the main chain. erefore, in case C , Pooli can earn the reward
c
′
¬i f1 f2(
1
1 − f1 +
1
1 − f2 )
1 − α1 − α2
1 − f1 − f2 (c
′
1 + c
′
2 ≤ 1).
Lastly, Pooli can earn the reward
R¬i fi
α¬i + fi
through inltration mining. Based on the above rewards for these
cases, the rewards R1 of Pool1 and R2 of Pool2 can be expressed as
Eq. (6) and (7), respectively. 
Next, we show that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, and
this equilibrium point does not represent honest mining by both
players since a pool can always earn the extra reward by executing
the FAW aack against a compliant pool.
Theorem 7.2. e game has a unique Nash equilibrium (f1, f2),
and this is either a point satisfying ∂R1
∂f1
= 0, ∂R2
∂f2
= 0 or a point on a
borderline satisfying these restricted conditions.
Proof Sketch. To prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium,
it suces to show that the second partial derivatives of R1 and R2
for f1 and f2, respectively, are always negative under the following
conditions:
0 ≤ f1 ≤ α1 ≤ 1
0 ≤ f2 ≤ α2 ≤ 1
α1 + α2 ≤ 1
0 ≤ c1, c2 ≤ 1
0 ≤ c′1 + c
′
2 ≤ 1.
erefore, a unique Nash equilibrium point exists since the func-
tions are strictly concave under these conditions [33].
Next, we nd the equilibrium point by using Best-response dy-
namics. Pool1 and Pool2 start with (f1, f2) = (0, 0) and alternately
update these values to the most protable inltration mining power.
If we rst update Pool1’s inltration power f (1)1 to maximize R1,
then Pool2’s inltration power f (1)2 would be adjusted to maximize
R2 according to f (1)1 . Aer that, Pool1’s inltration power f
(2)
1
again is updated for maximizing R1 based on f (1)2 . is process
repeats continuously. When we generalize this for the k-th process,
f
(k )
1 and f
(k )
2 are represented by
f
(k )
1 = arg max0≤f1≤α1
R
′
1(f1, f (k−1)2 ), f
(k )
2 = arg max0≤f2≤α2
R
′
1(f (k )1 , f2),
respectively. If f (k )1 and f
(k )
2 converge as k approaches innity,
the values will be in a Nash equilibrium. e Nash equilibrium
(f1, f2) is either a point satisfying ∂R1∂f1 = 0,
∂R2
∂f2
= 0 or a point on a
borderline of the possible region. 
7.2 antitative Analysis
We quantitatively analyze the results of the game between two
pools in the Nash equilibrium point. To reduce the parameter
dimensions, we assume that ci and c
′
i are symmetrical for i = 1, 2
and can be expressed as c and c/2, respectively, while (0 ≤ c ≤ 1).
Fig. 6 represents the results of the FAW aack game in terms of α2
and c if α1 is 0.2. Figs. 6a and 6b show inltration mining power
f1 and f2 in the equilibrium. Figs. 6c and 6d represent RERs (%)
R
′
1 and R
′
2 of Pool1 and Pool2 (these parameters are dened as in
Section 5.2) in the equilibrium, respectively, in terms of α2 and
c . e black lines in Figs. 6c and 6d are the borderlines at which
Pool1 and Pool2 earn the same RER as an honest miner, respectively.
at is, Pool1 and Pool2 can earn the extra reward in the regions
above the black lines in the corresponding gure, while taking a
loss below the black lines. As a result, Pool1 and Pool2 can win
the game if (α2, c) is above the black lines in Figs. 6c and 6d when
Pool1’s size is 0.2. Figs. 6c and 6d also show that the FAW aack
game becomes a pool size game, because the region above the black
line is the case in which Pool1’s size is larger than Pool2’s size (and
vice versa).
7.3 Winning Conditions
Eyal discovered that a game between two pools for the BWH aack
brings forth the “miner’s dilemma”, because both suer a loss in
the Nash equilibrium when their computational power is less than
0.5 [15]. In the FAW aack game, the miner’s dilemma may not
occur, even if the size of each of the pools is less than 0.5. e
region to the right side of each line in Fig. 7 represents the winning
range of Pool1 in terms of c . e ten lines represent borderlines at
which Pool1 can earn the same reward as an honest miner when
values of c vary from 1 to 0.1. When c is 1, the borderline is exactly
the line α1 = α2. In other words, the larger pool always earns
the extra reward, and the smaller pool takes a loss. erefore, the
result becomes dependent on pool size, even in the region where
the miner’s dilemma holds in the BWH aack game. Furthermore,
the region in which the miner’s dilemma does not hold exists even
if c is less than 1. In summary, under reasonable conditions for two
pools’ computational power and network capabilities, the largest
pool earns the extra reward. is makes the FAW aack a dominant
strategy for any large pool to launch against smaller pools.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6: Results of the FAW attack game with varying
Pool2’s size α2 and network capability c where Pool1’s size α1
is 0.2. (a) and (b) show the inltrationmining power of Pool1
and Pool2 as f1 and f2 in the Nash equilibrium point, respec-
tively. (c) and (d) represent RERs (%) R′1 and R
′
2 for Pool1 and
Pool2 in the Nash equilibrium point according to α2 and c,
respectively. Also, the black lines in (c) and (d) are the bor-
derlines at which Pool1 and Pool2 earn the same RER as an
honest miner, respectively. Above the lines, each pool earns
the extra reward, so the prisoner’s dilemma does not hold.
Figure 7: Winning conditions for Pool1 with respect to c. e
ten lines represent borderlines at which Pool1 can earn the
same reward as an honest miner according to c. e region
to the right side of each line represents the winning range of
Pool1 in terms of c. Winning conditions for Pool2 are found
by swapping the x- and y-axes.
8 FAW ATTACK VS. SELFISH MINING
In this section, we discuss the practicality of the FAW aack in
comparison with selsh mining, given that both require intentional
forks. Eyal et al. [18] used the term γ to represent the fraction of
the honest network that selects an aacker’s block as the main
chain in a fork in selsh mining. e value of γ cannot be 1 because
when the intentional fork occurs, the honest miner who generated
a block will select his block, not that of the selsh miner. erefore,
the value of γ is upper bounded as follows if α is the aacker’s
computational power and oi is the computational power of the
honest node i:
γ ≤ 1 −
∑
i
oi
(1 − α)
(
1 − oi(1 − α)
)
≤ 1 −
∑
i
o2i
(1 − α)2 < 1 −
∑
i
o2i .
Note that the total power of honest nodes is 1−α (i.e.,∑i oi = 1−α ).
erefore, if a selsh miner belongs to the Unknown group in
Table 2 (i.e., is a solo miner or a closed pool), the value of γ is
loosely upper bounded by 0.89 according to Table 2. Eyal et al. [18]
stated that an aacker needs at least 1−γ3−2γ computational power
for selsh mining to be protable. As a result, the aacker needs
computing power of at least 0.09 even when her network capability
is optimal. However, this power is too high for most solo miners or
closed pools. For them, selsh mining is not protable. In contrast,
the FAW aack is always protable regardless of an aacker’s
computational power (see Sections 5 and 6). is makes the FAW
aack more practical for a solo miner or a closed pool.
Next, we consider a case in which a selsh miner is an open
pool manager. Here, the cost for selsh mining may not be very
high for the aacker. However, the selsh open pool manager must
be concerned about whether honest miners will leave her pool
by disclosing direct evidence before she earns the extra reward,
because honest miners do not want to destabilize Bitcoin. Indeed,
honest miners belonging to the aacker’s pool can easily detect
that their pool manager is a selsh mining aacker in two ways.
First, if the manager does not propagate blocks immediately when
honest miners generate FPoWs, the honest miners will know that
their pool manager is an aacker. Second, the blockchain has an
abnormal shape when a selsh miner exists; Bitcoin miners can
determine which open pool has caused the abnormal shape because
which open pool has found each block is public information. is
information is provided by several services [4, 32]. For example,
when one branch of a fork contains consecutive blocks generated
by the aacker’s pool in a short time period, the pool may be sus-
pect. Even if the aacker tweaks her strategy to evade detection
by releasing her blocks gradually, one branch of the fork will still
contain consecutive blocks generated by the aacker’s pool. ere-
fore, all participants in Bitcoin including honest miners in the pool
can detect that the pool is a selsh miner before she earns the extra
reward. As a result, open pool managers are unlikely to execute
selsh mining.
When the FAW aack occurs and the aacker is an open pool
manager, the fork rate may increase; therefore, detecting the exis-
tence of the FAW aack may not be dicult. However, identifying
the aacker is more challenging than with selsh mining because
if an honest miner in her pool generates an FPoW, the FAW at-
tacker propagates the block immediately, which diers from selsh
mining. In addition, since the inltration miner in the target pool
generates forks intentionally by propagating FPoWs to the target
pool, the identity of the target but not the aacker is disclosed. In
other words, the aacker’s pool looks innocent, and meanwhile the
target pool looks strange due to its high rate of forks.
9 NETWORK CAPABILITY C
For an aacker to execute an FAW aack, she needs to know some
information in advance. First, an aacker’s optimal τ depends
not only on the aacker’s computation power, but also on that
of the target pool. erefore, she must know the target pool’s
computational power. Its approximate value can be obtained from
the current computational power distribution [4], which is public
information.
However, she also needs to know the value of network capabil-
ity c in order to adopt an optimal τ in Eq. (2). e term c is the
probability that an aacker’s FPoW from inltration mining will
be selected as the main chain. In this section, a possible range
of c is rst given, and then aacker behavior for a constant yet
unknown c is discussed. We extend this discussion to the case in
which c changes frequently. e results are promising. We show
that the FAW aack still improves upon the BWH aack, even if
c is unknown. Furthermore, interestingly, the range to which the
miner’s dilemma applies decreases compared to when c is known
in the FAW aack game.
e Possible Range of c: e value of network capability c is
greater than or equal to 0 by denition. In practice, the value of c is
positive, because it is possible for an aacker to listen to external block
propagation faster than the manager using Sybil nodes. Moreover, if
the target pool’s manager behaves rationally, the minimum value of
c (in Section 5) is the sum of the computational power of the aacker
and the target pool because the aacker and target pool select
her FPoW found through inltration mining. Here, the manager’s
rational behavior is to select the block found by inltration miner in
his pool as the main chain even if the inltration miner propagates
this FPoW to the manager right aer he notices that an external
miner has found a block. In the same manner, since two players in
the FAW aack game are rational, the value of c in the FAW aack
game between two pools is lower bounded byα1+α2. emaximum
value of c also depends on computational power distribution in the
Bitcoin network because an honest miner (neither belonging to
the target pool nor representing the aacker) who generates an
FPoW selects his own block, not the block from the aacker’s FPoW
from inltration mining. erefore, even if an aacker has optimal
network capability, the maximum value of c in Sections 5 and 6 is
upper bounded by
c =
∑
j
oj
1 − α − β (1 − oj ) = 1 −
∑
j o
2
j
1 − α − β
when oj is the computational power of an external honest miner
node j. Note that the total computational power of honest miners∑
j oj is 1−α − β . Also, the value of c in Section 7 is upper bounded
by
c =
∑
j
oj
1 −∑i=1∼n αi (1 − oj ) = 1 −
∑
o2j
1 −∑i=1∼n αi
when the game participants are n open pools. In this case, this
condition
∑
j oj = 1 −
∑
i=1∼n αi is satised.
For example, if two pools, F2Pool and BitFury, with computa-
tional powers of 20% and 10%, respectively, as in Table 2, participate
in the FAW aack game, the maximum value of c is about 0.914.
Note that this case does not fall into the miner’s dilemma, and,
therefore, the game becomes the pool size game. Moreover, when
the power of honest miners (oj ) is evenly distributed among many
nodes, c may be closer to 1. us, if an aacker executes the FAW
aack against all open pools, or if all open pools participate in the
FAW aack game, the maximum value of c may be close to 1.
In addition, network capability c can be expressed as γ (1 − α −
β) + α + β when the target is one pool, and the target manager
behaves rationally in order to reduce loss (applying the network
capability term γ used in prior research [18, 30]).
Constant c: We rst assume that the value of c is constant but
unknown to the FAW aacker against one pool. Under such condi-
tions, she cannot apply Eq. (2) directly because optimal τ depends
on the value of c . However, she knows that the value of c is greater
than or equal to 0 if the target pools’ managers are honest. us,
she can choose τ0, obtained from Eq. (2) substituting c with 0. In
such a case, the aacker can still earn a greater reward than the
BWH aacker. e FAW aacker’s reward Ra (τ0) is
max
τ
(RBWH ) + cτ0α · 1 − α − β1 − τ0α ·
τ0α
β + τ0α
,
which is lower bounded by the BWH aacker’s reward RBWH .
If the target pool’s manager is rational, the aacker repeats the
above process, substituting c with α + β , the minimum value of c
in Eq. (2). us, she uses τα+β as the value of τ . en, the FAW
aacker earns extra reward that is certainly more than that for
the BWH aacker. Note that the aacker can test whether the
manager is rational by submiing a stale FPoW. e aacker can
also learn about c , investigating the relationship between long-
term and theoretical rewards for the minimum value of c , when we
assume that c is constant. As a result, she can nd an optimal τ
(Eq. (2)), and her reward converges to the maximum value of Ra .
Figure 8: e winning condition of Pool1 versus c. Ten lines
represent borderlines at which Pool1 can earn the same re-
ward as an honest miner according to c. e region to the
right side of each line represents the winning range of Pool1
in terms of c. Pool2’s winning conditions are found by swap-
ping the x- and y-axes.
FrequentlyChanging c: eBitcoin network oen changes, with
the power distribution and number of nodes shiing as well [4, 6].
us, the value of c may also change. When an aacker executes the
FAW aack against one pool and the pool manager is honest, as in
the above case, she must use τ0 as the value of τ . In fact, the aacker
may ignore the fact that c changes. For example, she may assume
c = 0 and choose an optimal strategy. Applying this strategy to the
FAW aack against the four open pools in Table 2, she can earn an
RER of up to 3.99%. erefore, the FAW aack improves her RER by
up to 34.62% of that for the BWH aack even if the aacker knows
nothing about c . Moreover, in the FAW aack game between two
pools, two pools may assume c = α1 + α2, which is the minimum
value of c , in practice. Using the FAW game between F2Pool (Pool1)
and BTCC Pool (Pool2) in Table 2 as an example, both managers
may assume c = 0.3. en, the winning conditions for F2Pool
(Pool1) are shown in Fig. 8. Furthermore, compared to Fig. 7, Fig. 8
shows how the region aected by the miner’s dilemma decreases.
Indeed, when the assumed value of c decreases, the region aected
by the miner’s dilemma decreases as well.
10 DISCUSSION
10.1 Rational Manager
In the FAW aack, an aacker submits an FPoW to a manager to
generate a fork when an external miner broadcasts a block. For
her block to be selected, she must quickly notice the external block
propagation using Sybil nodes. If she detects the propagation be-
fore the pool manager, a fork can be caused naturally, from the
manager’s perspective. When she learns of the propagation from
the manager (instead of detecting it rst), she submits her FPoW
immediately. In this case, an honest manager regards the aacker’s
FPoW as stale and invalidates it because he knows a new round
has already started. However, a rational manager may not act in
accordance with the protocol, since it would always be benecial for
him to submit a local FPoW. We already proved that the manager’s
behavior can decrease his pool’s loss, as in Section 5. is behavior
decreases the manager’s loss and increases the aacker’s reward as
a side-eect. Note that in the FAW aack game in Section 7, since
two pools are aacking each other, both managers are rational.
erefore, they always propagate a block found by the opponent’s
inltration miner in their own pool, even if they received a block
from an external miner rst.
10.2 Detecting FAW Attacks and Attackers
We showed that FAW aacks provide greater rewards to aackers
than existing BWH aacks. From the target pool’s perspective,
detecting inltration mining and identifying the aacker are impor-
tant. Indeed, the FAW aack is easier to detect than the BWH aack
because of the high fork rate. Additionally, the manager should
suspect and expel any miner who submits stale FPoWs, rather than
paying out the reward for the current round. Note that rewards
for previous rounds cannot be returned to the manager because
of the properties of Bitcoin. e aacker may easily launch the
aack using many Sybil nodes with many churns, replacing the
expelled miner. is strategy allows the aacker to receive rewards
without being greatly aected by the manager behavior, even if her
FAW aack is detected and her inltration miner is expelled. For
example, assuming that an aacker inltrates a target pool with L
inltration miners, each with dierent worker ID and password, if
the L-th inltration miner is detected by the manager, the remain-
ing L − 1 miners can still earn rewards. en the aacker’s reward
is lower bounded by
(1 − τ )α
1 − τ α +
β
1 − τ α ·
(L − d )τ α
Lβ + (L − d )τ α +cτ α ·
1 − α − β
1 − τ α ·
(L − d − 1)τ α
Lβ + τ α (L − d − 1) .
Here d is dened as the average number of FPoWs, which are
submied by inltration miners for a while untill the pool earns
the reward for one block, and but not selected as the main chain.
e value of d can be expressed as
(1 − c)γα(1 − α − β)
β + cγα(1 − α − β) .
erefore, the more inltration miners are used (i.e., the more L
increases), the less detection aects the aacker. She may continue
the FAW aack by substituting the L-th miner with another inl-
tration miner. us, the FAW aacker’s reward is still beer than
the BWH aacker’s for a properly chosen L because the minimum
value of c is positive in practice. Additionally, an aacker can twist
the FAW aack by propagating the withheld FPoW only when she
notices external block propagation faster than the manager if the
manager is honest. Also, she can hide her IP address by using
hidden services such as Tor.
10.3 Countermeasures
Even if we focus on the FAW aack against Bitcoin, other proof-of-
work cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum [38], Litecoin [22], Doge-
coin [14], and Permacoin [27] are also vulnerable to the FAW aack.
Especially, Ethereum adopts a protocol based on GHOST [36] un-
like Bitcoin. erefore, the FAW aacker’s reward in the case of
Ethereum should be recalculated. Because the FAW aack breaks
the dilemma and is more practical than selsh mining, it can be
launched from large pools in these cryptocurrencies.
We discuss possible countermeasures against the FAW aack.
First, an approach must satisfy backward compatibility in order to
be a practical defense mechanism. Backward compatibility means
miners who have not upgraded their mining hardware can still
mine aer the measures are implemented [39], retaining miners’
current mining hardware investments [17]. is is important be-
cause Bitcoin’s security is directly related to total mining power.
erefore, it is impractical to make a major change to the Bitcoin
protocol for defense. e two-phase PoW protocol, called Oblivious
Shares, presented by Rosenfeld [34] which can defend against both
BWH and FAW aacks is impractical on these grounds.
Second, to prevent FAW aacks, it is not sucient to just detect
the inltration miner. As described in Section 10.2, detection rarely
aects the FAW aacker. For detection, one may consider the
following mechanism:
“Mining pool managers could provide a beacon value that is up-
dated very frequently (i.e., every couple of seconds) and only give
points for PPoWs that include a recent beacon value.”
is defense has an eect only when an aacker notices external
block propagation faster than the manager, subsequently propagat-
ing a withheld FPoW. (If the aacker notices the propagation aer
the manager, the manager already knows that the FPoW is stale.)
In this case, the manager may notice the FPoW is stale because it
includes a stale beacon value. However, the manager would still
propagate a valid block based on the FPoW. Note that this credible
behavior does not deviate from Bitcoin protocol because the man-
ager received the internal FPoW before the external one. en, as
mentioned in Section 10.2, the remaining inltration miners (e.g.,
L−1 inltration miners in Section 10.2) receive a reward even if the
inltration miner (e.g., the L-th inltration miner), who submied
the FPoW, is expelled. As a result, the aacker still earns a higher
reward than the BWH aacker.
Another two-phase PoW [17] proposed by Eyal and Sirer can
be used to defend against FAW aacks. is defense has beer
backward compatibility than Rosenfeld’s Oblivious Shares [34]. In
both schemes, a miner does not know whether his PPoW is a valid
block because generating a PoW is divided into two steps. However,
the Bitcoin community would not like to adopt the two-phase PoW
proposed by Eyal and Sirer as well [15]. Such an approach would
be inconvenient for closed pools and solo miners who are not con-
cerned about being targets of BWH and FAW aacks. For pool
managers, this protocol increases the cost of pool operation. More-
over, pool miners are concerned about block withholding by pool
managers. A rational manager can waste miners’ power by with-
holding blocks in her pool and then earn higher rewards through
solo mining. If the malicious manager throws away all blocks found
by miners, miners can detect it in a short time period. However,
when the manager throws away just a part of the blocks (e.g., 5%),
miners cannot detect it for a long time. Such behavior can be seen
as a new variant of the BWH aack. As a result, two-phase PoW
proposed by Eyal and Sirer is hardly suitable for adoption by the
Bitcoin system. Note that Oblivious Shares also has drawbacks
described above.
Eyal [15] and Luu et al. [24] have introduced several countermea-
sures against BWH aacks. A joining fee was one such measure,
but Eyal concluded that miners prefer exibility. A honeypot trap
was also proposed, but the idea was quickly dropped due to high
overhead. Moreover, even if this idea is practical, BWH and FAW
aacks can still be protable if an aacker uses many (L) inltration
miners. As established in Section 10.2, the remaining L − 1 miners
can still receive rewards even if the L-th miner is detected. Indeed,
the reward for a BWH aacker given the honeypot trap is lower
bounded by
(1 − τ )α
1 − τα +
β
1 − τα ·
(L − d)τα
Lβ + (L − d)τα if d =
γα(1 − γα)
β
.
Both studies also proposed new reward systems to incentivize min-
ers to submit FPoWs immediately. To prevent FAW aacks, we may
consider a new reward system. A pool miner who nds an FPoW
(as opposed to a PPoW) can receive a bonus from the manager. If,
for example, the manager receives 1 BTC for each block, the miner
who nds an FPoW may receive 0.1 BTC, with 0.9 BTC distributed
among all miners in proportion to their work shares. eorem 10.1
shows this defensive reward scheme against FAW aacks.
Theorem 10.1. If a reward fraction t of the total reward (e.g., 1
BTC) for one valid block is given to the miner who nds an FPoW,
then the aacker’s reward, Ra , is
(1−τ )α
1−τ α +
β
1−τ α · (1 − t) · τ αβ+τ α + cτα ·
1−α−β
1−τ α · (t + (1 − t) τ αβ+τ β ). (8)
When the manager chooses
t ≥ 12(1 − cmax (1 − P))
for the pool’s current computational power, P , Ra is always less than
α .
Proof Sketch. e aacker can still earn the reward (1−τ )α1−τ α
through innocent mining. When an honest miner nds an FPoW
in the target pool, she gets paid a fraction of the reward 1 − t
according to her inltration mining power. Because the probability
that an honest miner nds an FPoW in the target pool is β1−τ α , the
aacker’s reward from the case is
β
1 − τ α · (1 − t ) ·
τ α
β + τ α
.
Next, if she submits an FPoW in order to generate a fork, she can
receive the reward including t . erefore, the aacker’s reward for
the case is
cτ α · 1 − α − β1 − τ α · (t + (1 − t )
τ α
β + τ β
).
Considering above all cases, the total reward Ra for the aacker is
Eq. (8).
en we nd the condition for t which makes Ra less than the
reward Rh of an honest miner, who possesses the computational
power, α .
(1−τ )α
1−τ α +
β
1−τ α · (1 − t) · τ αβ+τ α + cτα ·
1−α−β
1−τ α · (t + (1 − t) τ αβ+τ β ) < α
⇔ β + τα − τ
2α + cτ 2α(1 − α − β)
(1 − τα)(β + τα) − t
βτ − cτ β(1 − α − β)
(1 − τα)(β + τα) < 1
⇔ −τ 2α + cτ 2α(1 − α − β) + ταβ + τ 2α2 < tβτ (1 − c(1 − α − β))
⇔ τα(c(1 − α − β) − 1) + τα
2 + αβ
β(1 − c(1 − α − β)) < t (9)
erefore, for Ra to be less than α , t has to satisfy Eq. (9) for all
possible values of τ and c . (Note that the range of τ is between 0
and 1, and c ranges from 0 to cmax .) In other words, t has to be
greater than the maximum of the le-hand side of Eq. (9) for τ and
c . e maximum can be derived as follows.
τα(c(1 − α − β) − 1) + τα2 + αβ
β(1 − c(1 − α − β))
= τα
(
α(1 − c) + c(1 − β) − 1
β(1 − c(1 − α − β))
)
+
α
1 − c(1 − α − β)
≤ α1 − c(1 − α − β) (∵ α(1 − c) + c(1 − β) ≤
1
2 (1 − c) + c ≤ 1)
≤ α1 − cmax (1 − α − β)
us, the condition of t needed to prevent the FAW aack are
α
1 − cmax (1 − α − β) ≤ t . (10)
e le-hand side of Eq. (10) is the same as the computational
power α of an aacker when cmax is zero. is particular case
is equivalent to a defensive reward system for the BWH aack
proposed by Luu et al. [24].
Indeed, because the manager does not know who the aacker is,
he does not know either α or β . However, he can know β+τα as his
pool’s current computational power. us, we express the condition
of t as an equation related to the current pool’s computational
power. When the pool’s current computational power is P , the
le-hand side of Eq. (10) is upper bounded by
α
1 − cmax (1 − P) .
Because α is less than 0.5, the value is less than
1
2(1 − cmax (1 − P)) . (11)
As a result, if t is greater than Eq. (11), Ra is less than α . 
is theorem shows that the manager can make honest mining
more protable than the FAW aack by choosing t properly. Un-
fortunately, miners may hesitate to join pools using this reward
system because of the high reward variance. We may also consider
a reward system in which pool miners get a wage for multiple
rounds once. Damage to the aacker due to detection would be
more visible even if the damage decreases as the number of inl-
tration miners (i.e., L) increases. However, this scheme also causes
high reward variance, which might make it dicult for the pool
manager to aract more power. erefore, he should be cautious
about adopting this new reward system, even if it can decrease the
risk of the FAW aack.
11 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed FAW aacks in which an aacker
withholds a block in a target pool and submits it when an external
miner propagates a valid block. Such an aack can generate an
intentional fork. Our aack not only improves the practicality of
selsh mining but also yields rewards equal to or greater than those
of BWH aacks. Unlike the “miner’s dilemma” that arises in a BWH
aack game, an FAW aack game can produce a clear winner in
the Nash equilibrium point – the larger mining pool gains while
the smaller pool loses. Interestingly, rational behavior of the target
pool manager also makes FAW aacks more protable. Participants
in the Bitcoin network want a cheap and ecient defense against
aacks, including FAW aacks, without introducing major changes
to the Bitcoin protocol or causing side-eects. Unfortunately, we
cannot nd such a defense, and discovering a solution remains an
open problem. erefore, we leave it as a future work. e irrele-
vance of the miner’s dilemma unlike BWH aacks and practicality
unlike selsh mining means that proof-of-work cryptocurrencies
are expected to see large miners executing FAW aacks.
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APPENDIX A
Algorithm 1 FAW aack against one pool
1: A: e miner set of an aacker
2: P : e miner set of a target pool
3: Fk : e k-th found FPoW for one round
4: X ← work(Y ): e miner set Y nds FPoW X
5: Y ← submit(X ): FPoW X is submied to the manager of Y
6: publish(Y ,X ): e manager of Y publishes FPoW X
7: discard(X ): An aacker discards FPoW X
8: function round
9: k = 1
10: Generate a Fork:
11: if Fk ← work(A ∩ Pc ) then
12: publish(A, Fk ) . Case A
13: else if Fk ← work(Ac ∩ P) then
14: P ← submit(Fk )
15: publish(P , Fk ) . Case B
16: else if Fk ← work(Ac ∩ Pc ) then
17: if k , 1 then
18: publish(Ac ∩ Pc , Fk )
19: P ← submit(F1)
20: publish(P , F1) . Fork, Case C
21: else
22: publish(Ac ∩ Pc , Fk ) . Case D
23: end if
24: else
25: Fk ← work(A ∩ P)
26: if k , 1 then
27: discard(Fk )
28: end if
29: k++
30: goto Generate a Fork
31: end if
32: end function
Algorithm 2 FAW aack against n pools
1: A: e miner set of an aacker
2: Pj : e miner set of a target pool j
3: P : ∪Pj
4: Fk : e k-th found FPoW for one round
5: Fwh,i : e FPoW found by A in the pool i
6: X ← work(Y ): e miner set Y nds FPoW X
7: Y ← submit(X ): FPoW X is submied to the manager of Y
8: publish(Y ,X ): e manager of Y publishes FPoW X
9: discard(X ): An aacker discards FPoW X
10: function round
11: k = 1
12: foreach Pi ⊂ P do
13: Fwh,i = ∅
14: Generate a Fork:
15: if Fk ← work(A ∩ Pc ) then
16: publish(A, Fk ) . Case A
17: else if Fk ← work(Ac ∩ Pi ) then
18: Pi ← submit(Fk )
19: publish(Pi , Fk ) . Case B
20: else if Fk ← work(Ac ∩ Pc ) then
21: if Fwh,i , ∅ then
22: publish(Ac ∩ Pc , Fk )
23: Pi ← submit(Fwh,i )
24: publish(Pi , Fwh,i ) . Fork, Case C, D
25: else
26: publish(Ac ∩ Pc , Fk ) . Case E
27: end if
28: else
29: Fk ← work(A ∩ Pi )
30: if Fwh,i = ∅ then
31: Fwh,i = Fk
32: else
33: discard(Fk )
34: end if
35: k++
36: goto Generate a Fork
37: end if
38: end foreach
39: end function
